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Abstract: The evolution of the
faculty of language largely remains
an enigma. In this essay, we ask
why. Language’s evolutionary
analysis is complicated because it
has no equivalent in any nonhu-
man species. There is also no
consensus regarding the essential
nature of the language ‘‘pheno-
type.’’ According to the ‘‘Strong
Minimalist Thesis,’’ the key distin-
guishing feature of language (and
what evolutionary theory must
explain) is hierarchical syntactic
structure. The faculty of language
is likely to have emerged quite
recently in evolutionary terms,
some 70,000–100,000 years ago,
and does not seem to have under-
gone modification since then,
though individual languages do of
course change over time, operating
within this basic framework. The
recent emergence of language and
its stability are both consistent with
the Strong Minimalist Thesis, which
has at its core a single repeatable
operation that takes exactly two
syntactic elements a and b and
assembles them to form the set {a, b}.
It is uncontroversial that language has
evolved, just like any other trait of living
organisms. That is, once—not so long ago
in evolutionary terms—there was no
language at all, and now there is, at least
in Homo sapiens. There is considerably
less agreement as to how language
evolved. There are a number of reasons
for this lack of agreement. First, ‘‘lan-
guage’’ is not always clearly defined, and
this lack of clarity regarding the language
phenotype leads to a corresponding lack of
clarity regarding its evolutionary origins.
Second, there is often confusion as to the
nature of the evolutionary process and
what it can tell us about the mechanisms
of language. Here we argue that the basic
principle that underlies language’s hierar-
chical syntactic structure is consistent
with a relatively recent evolutionary
emergence.
Conceptualizations of
Language
The language faculty is often equated
with ‘‘communication’’—a trait that is
shared by all animal species and possibly
also by plants. In our view, for the
purposes of scientific understanding, lan-
guage should be understood as a particular
computational cognitive system, imple-
mented neurally, that cannot be equated
with an excessively expansive notion of
‘‘language as communication’’ [1]. Exter-
nalized language may be used for com-
munication, but that particular function is
largely irrelevant in this context. Thus, the
origin of the language faculty does not
generally seem to be informed by consid-
erations of the evolution of communica-
tion. This viewpoint does not preclude the
possibility that communicative consider-
ations can play a role in accounting for the
maintenance of language once it has
appeared or for the historical language
change that has clearly occurred within
the human species, with all individuals
sharing a common language faculty, as
some mathematical models indicate [1–3].
A similar misconception is that language is
coextensive with speech and that the
evolution of vocalization or auditory-vocal
learning can therefore inform us about the
evolution of language (Box 1) [1,4].
However, speech and speech perception,
while functioning as possible external
interfaces for the language system, are
not identical to it. An alternative external-
ization of language is in the visual domain,
as sign language [1]; even haptic external-
ization by touch seems possible in deaf and
blind individuals [5]. Thus, while the
evolution of auditory-vocal learning may
be relevant for the evolution of speech, it is
not for the language faculty per se. We
maintain that language is a computational
cognitive mechanism that has hierarchical
syntactic structure at its core [1], as
outlined in the next section.
The Faculty of Language
According to the ‘‘Strong
Minimalist Thesis’’
In the last few years, certain linguistic
theories have arrived at a much more
narrowly defined and precise phenotype
characterizing human language syntax. In
place of a complex rule system or accounts
grounded on general notions of ‘‘culture’’
or ‘‘communication,’’ it appears that
human language syntax can be defined
in an extremely simple way that makes
conventional evolutionary explanations
much simpler. In this view, human
language syntax can be characterized via
a single operation that takes exactly two
(syntactic) elements a and b and puts them
together to form the set {a, b}. We call this
basic operation ‘‘merge’’ [1]. The ‘‘Strong
Minimalist Thesis’’ (SMT) [6] holds that
merge along with a general cognitive
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requirement for computationally minimal
or efficient search suffices to account for
much of human language syntax. The
SMT also requires two mappings: one to
an internal conceptual interface for
thought and a second to a sensory-motor
interface that externalizes language as
speech, sign, or other modality [1]. The
basic operation itself is simple. Given
merge, two items such as the and apples
are assembled as the set {the, apples}.
Crucially, merge can apply to the results of
its own output so that a further application
of merge to ate and {the, apples} yields the
set {ate, {the, apples}}, in this way
deriving the full range of characteristic
hierarchical structure that distinguishes
human language from all other known
nonhuman cognitive systems.
As the text below and Figure 1 shows,
merge also accounts for the characteristic
appearance of displacement in human
language—the apparent ‘‘movement’’ of
phrases from one position to another.
Displacement is not found in artificially
constructed languages like computer pro-
gramming languages and raises difficulties
for parsing as well as communication. On
the SMT account, however, displacement
arises naturally and is to be expected,
rather than exceptional, as seems true in
every human language that has been
examined carefully. Furthermore, hierar-
chical language structure is demonstrably
present in humans, as shown, for instance,
by online brain imaging experiments [7],
but absent in nonhuman species, e.g.,
chimpanzees taught sign language demon-
strably lack this combinatorial ability [8].
Thus, before the appearance of merge,
there was no faculty of language as such,
because this requires merge along with the
conceptual atoms of the lexicon. Absent
this, there is no way to arrive at the
essentially infinite number of syntactic
language structures, e.g., ‘‘the brown
cow,’’ ‘‘a black cat behind the mat’’ [9–
11], etc. This view leaves room for the
possibility that some conceptual atoms
were present antecedent to merge itself,
though at present this remains entirely
speculative. Even if true, there seems to be
no evidence for an antecedent combina-
torial and hierarchical syntax. Further-
more, merge itself is uniform in the
contemporary human population as well
as in the historical record, in contrast to
human group differences such as the adult
ability to digest lactose or skin pigmenta-
tion [12]. There is no doubt that a normal
child from England raised in northern
Alaska would readily learn Eskimo-Aleut,
or vice versa; there have been no con-
firmed group differences in the ability of
children to learn their first language,
despite one or two marginal, indirect,
and as yet unsubstantiated correlative
indications [13]. This uniformity and
stability points to the absence of major
evolutionary change since the emergence
of the language faculty. Taken together,
these facts provide good evidence that
merge was indeed the key evolutionary
innovation for the language faculty.
It is sometimes suggested that external
motor sequences are ‘‘hierarchical’’ in this
sense and so provide an antecedent
platform for language [14]. However, as
has been argued [15], motor sequences
resemble more the ‘‘sequence of letters in
the alphabet than the sequences of words
in a sentence’’ ([15], p. 221). (For expos-
itory purposes, we omit here several
technical linguistic details about the label-
ling of these words; see [16].) Along with
the conceptual atoms of the lexicon, the
SMT holds that merge, plus the internal
interface mappings to the conceptual
system, yields what has been called the
‘‘language of thought’’ [17].
More narrowly, the SMT also suffices to
automatically derive some of the most
central properties of human language
syntax. For example, one of the most
distinctive properties of human language
syntax is that of ‘‘displacement,’’ along
with what is sometimes called ‘‘duality of
semantic patterning.’’ For example, in the
sentence ‘‘(Guess) what boys eat,’’ ‘‘what’’
takes on a dual role and is interpreted in
two places: first, as a question ‘‘operator’’
at the front of the sentence, where it is
pronounced; and second, as a variable that
serves as the argument of the verb eat, the
thing eaten, where it is not pronounced
(Figure 1). (There are marginal exceptions
to the nonpronunciation of the second
‘‘what’’ that, when analyzed carefully,
support the picture outlined here.) Given
the free application of merge, we expect
human languages to exhibit this phenom-
enon of displacement without any further
stipulation. This is simply because operat-
ing freely, without any further constraints,
merge derives this possibility. In our
example ‘‘(Guess) what boys eat,’’ we
assume that successive applications of
merge as in our earlier example will first
derive {boys, {eat, what}}—analogous to
{boys, {eat, apples}}. Now we note that
one can simply apply merge to the two
syntactic objects {boys,{eat, what}} and
{what}, in which {what} is a subcompo-
nent (a subset) of the first syntactic object
rather than some external set. This yields
something like {what, {boys, {eat,
what}}}, in this way marking out the two
required operator and variable positions
for what.
The Nature of Evolution
Evolutionary analysis might be brought
to bear on language in two different ways.
First, evolutionary considerations could be
used to explain the mechanisms of human
language. For instance, principles derived
from studying the evolution of communi-
cation might be used to predict, or even
explain, the structural organization of
language. This approach is fraught with
difficulties. Questions of evolution or
Box 1. Comparative Linguistics: Not Much to Compare
A major stumbling block for the comparative analysis of language evolution is
that, so far, there is no evidence for human-like language syntax in any
nonhuman species [4,41,42]. There is no a priori reason why a version of such a
combinatorial computational system could not have evolved in nonhuman
animals, either through common descent (e.g., apes) or convergent evolution
(e.g., songbirds) [1,18]. Although the auditory-vocal domain is just one possible
external interface for language (with signing being another), it could be argued
that the strongest animal candidates for human-like syntax are songbirds and
parrots [1,41,42]. Not only do they have a similar brain organization underlying
auditory-vocal behavior [4,43,44], they also exhibit vocal imitation learning that
proceeds in a very similar way to speech acquisition in human infants [4,41,42].
This ability is absent in our closest relatives, the great apes [1,4]. In addition, like
human spoken language, birdsong involves patterned vocalizations that can be
quite complex, with a set of rules that govern variable song element sequences
known as ‘‘phonological syntax’’ [1,4,41,42,45]. Contrary to recent suggestions
[46,47], to date there is no evidence to suggest that birdsong patterns exhibit the
hierarchical syntactic structure that characterizes human language [41,48,49] or
any mapping to a level forming a language of thought as in humans. Avian vocal-
learning species such as parrots are able to synchronize their behavior to variable
rhythmic patterns [50]. Such rhythmic abilities may be involved in human
prosodic processing, which is known to be an important factor in language
acquisition [51].
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function are fundamentally different from
those relating to mechanism, so evolution
can never ‘‘explain’’ mechanisms [18]. For
a start, the evolution of a particular trait
may have proceeded in different ways,
such as via common descent, convergence,
or exaptation, and it is not easy to establish
which of these possibilities (or combination
of them) is relevant [18,19]. More impor-
tantly, evolution by natural selection is not
a causal factor of either cognitive or neural
mechanisms [18]. Natural selection can be
seen as one causal factor for the historical
process of evolutionary change, but that is
merely stating the essence of the theory of
evolution. As we have argued, communi-
cation cannot be equated with language,
so its evolution cannot inform the mech-
anisms of language syntax. However,
evolutionary considerations—in particu-
lar, reconstructing the evolutionary history
of relevant traits—might provide clues or
hypotheses as to mechanisms, even though
such hypotheses have frequently been
shown to be false or misleading [18].
One such evolutionary clue is that,
contrary to received wisdom, recent anal-
yses suggest that significant genetic change
may occur in human populations over the
course of a few hundred years [19]. Such
rapid change could also have occurred in
the case of language, as we will argue
below. In addition, as detailed in the next
section, paleoanthropological evidence
suggests that the appearance of symbolic
thought, our most accurate proxy for
language, was a recent evolutionary event.
For instance, the first evidence of puta-
tively symbolic artifacts dates back to only
around 100,000 years ago, significantly
after the appearance on the planet of
anatomically distinctive Homo sapiens
around 200,000 years ago [20,21],
The second, more traditional way of
applying evolutionary analysis to lan-
guage is to attempt to reconstruct its
evolutionary history. Here, too, we are
confronted with major explanatory obsta-
cles. For starters, language appears to be
unique to the species H. sapiens. That
eliminates one of the cornerstones of
evolutionary analysis, the comparative
method, which generally relies on features
that are shared by virtue of common
descent (Box 1) [1,4,18]. Alternatively,
analysis can appeal to convergent evolu-
tion, in which similar features, such as
birds’ wings and bats’ wings, arise inde-
pendently to ‘‘solve’’ functionally analo-
gous problems. Both situations help
constrain and guide evolutionary expla-
nation. Lacking both, as in the case of
language, makes the explanatory search
more difficult. In addition, evolutionary
analysis of language is often plagued by
popular, naı¨ve, or antiquated conceptions
of how evolution proceeds [19,22]. That
is, evolution is often seen as necessarily a
slow, incremental process that unfolds
gradually over the eons. Such a view of
evolutionary change is not consistent with
current evidence and our current under-
standing, in which evolutionary change
can be swift, operating within just a few
generations, whether it be in relation to
finches’ beaks on the Galapagos, insect
resistance to pesticides following WWII,
or human development of lactose toler-
ance within dairy culture societies, to
name a few cases out of many [19,22–24].
Paleoanthropology
Language leaves no direct imprint in
the fossil record, and the signals imparted
by putative morphological proxies are
highly mixed. Most of these involve speech
production and detection, neither of which
by itself is sufficient for inferring language
(see Box 2). After all, while the anatomical
potential to produce the frequencies used
in modern speech may be necessary for
the expression of language, it provides no
proof that language itself was actually
employed. What is more, it is not even
necessary for language, as the visual and
haptic externalization routes make clear.
Moreover, even granting that speech is a
requirement for language, it has been
argued convincingly [25,26] that equal
proportions of the horizontal and vertical
portions of the vocal tract are necessary for
producing speech. This conformation is
uniquely seen in our own species Homo
sapiens. In a similar vein, the aural ability
of nonhuman primates like chimpanzees
or extinct hominid species such as H.
neanderthalensis to perceive the sound
frequencies associated with speech
[26,27] says nothing about the ability of
these relatives to understand or produce
language. Finally, neither the absolute size
of the brain nor its external morphology as
seen in endocasts has been shown to be
relevant to the possession of language in
an extinct hominid (Figure 2) [28]. Recent
research has determined that Neander-
thals possessed the modern version of the
FOXP2 gene [29], malfunctions in which
produce speech deficits in modern people
[4,30]. However, FOXP2 cannot be
regarded as ‘‘the’’ gene ‘‘for’’ language,
since it is only one of many that have to be
functioning properly to permit its normal
expression.
In terms of historically calibrated
records, this leaves us only with archae-
ology, the archive of ancient human
behaviors—although we have once again
to seek indirect proxies for language. To
the extent that language is interdependent
with symbolic thought [20], the best
proxies in this domain are objects that
are explicitly symbolic in nature. Opin-
ions have varied greatly as to what
constitutes a symbolic object, but if one
excludes stone and other Paleolithic
implements from this category on the
fairly firm grounds that they are prag-
matic and that the techniques for making
them can be passed along strictly by
imitation [31], we are left with objects
from the African Middle Stone Age
(MSA) such as pierced shell beads from
various ,100,000-year-old sites (e.g.,
Figure 1. The binary operation of merge (X,Y) when Y is a subset of X leads to the
ubiquitous phenomenon of ‘‘displacement’’ in human language, as in Guess what boys
eat. Left: The circled structure Y, corresponding to what, the object of the verb eat, is a subset of
the circled structure X, corresponding to boys eat what. Right: The free application of merge to X,
Y in this case automatically leads to what occupying two syntactic positions, as required for
proper semantic interpretation. The original what remains as the object of the verb so that it can
serve as an argument to this predicate, and a copy of what, ‘‘displaced,’’ is now in the position of
a quantificational operator so that the form can be interpreted as ‘‘for what x, boys eat x.’’
Typically, only the higher what is actually pronounced, as indicated by the line drawn through the
lower what.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001934.g001
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[32]) and the ,80,000-year-old geomet-
rically engraved plaques from South
Africa’s Blombos Cave [33] as the earliest
undisputed symbolic objects. Such objects
began to be made only substantially after
the appearance, around 200,000 years
ago, of anatomically recognizable H.
sapiens, also in Africa [34]. To be sure,
this inference from the symbolic record,
like much else in paleontology, rests on
evidence that is necessarily quite indirect.
Nevertheless, the conclusion lines up with
what is known from genomics.
Our species was born in a technologi-
cally archaic context [35], and significant-
ly, the tempo of change only began picking
up after the point at which symbolic
objects appeared. Evidently, a new poten-
tial for symbolic thought was born with
our anatomically distinctive species, but it
was only expressed after a necessary
cultural stimulus had exerted itself. This
stimulus was most plausibly the appear-
ance of language in members of a species
that demonstrably already possessed the
peripheral vocal apparatus required to
externalize it [20,22]. Then, within a
remarkably short space of time, art was
invented, cities were born, and people had
reached the moon. By this reckoning, the
language faculty is an extremely recent
acquisition in our lineage, and it was
acquired not in the context of slow,
gradual modification of preexisting sys-
tems under natural selection but in a
single, rapid, emergent event that built
upon those prior systems but was not
predicted by them. It may be relevant to
note that the anatomical ability to express
language through speech was acquired at
a considerable cost, namely the not-
insignificant risk of adults choking to death
[25,36], as simultaneous breathing and
swallowing became impossible with the
descent of the larynx. However, since this
conformation was already in place before
language had demonstrably been acquired
(see Box 2), the ability to express language
cannot by itself have been the counter-
vailing advantage. Finally, there has been
no detectable evolution of the language
faculty since it emerged, with no known
group differences. This is another signa-
ture of relatively recent and rapid origin.
Box 2. The Infamous Hyoid Bone
A putative relationship between basicranial flexion, laryngeal descent, and the
ability to produce sounds essential to speech was suggested [52] before any fossil
hyoid bones, the sole hard-tissue components of the laryngeal apparatus, were
known. It was speculated that fossil hyoids would indicate when speech, and by
extension language, originated. A Neanderthal hyoid from Kebara in Israel
eventually proved very similar to its H. sapiens homologue, prompting the
declaration that speech capacity was fully developed in adult H. neanderthalensis
[53]. This was soon contested on the grounds that the morphology of the hyoid is
both subsidiary [25] and unrelated [26] to its still-controversial [36] position in the
neck. A recent study [54] focuses on the biomechanics, internal architecture, and
function of the Kebara fossil. The authors conclude that their results ‘‘add support
for the proposition that the Kebara 2 Neanderthal engaged in speech’’ ([54], p. 6).
However, they wisely add that the issue of Neanderthal language will be fully
resolved only on the basis of fuller comparative material. While the peripheral
ability to produce speech is undoubtedly a necessary condition for the expression
of vocally externalized language, it is not a sufficient one, and hyoid morphology,
like most other lines of evidence, is evidently no silver bullet for determining
when human language originated.
Figure 2. A crude plot of average hominid brain sizes over time. Although after an initial flatlining this plot appears to show consistent
enlargement of hominid brains over the last 2 million years, it is essential to note that these brain volumes are averaged across a number of
independent lineages within the genus Homo and likely represent the preferential success of larger-brained species. From [20]. Image credit: Gisselle
Garcia, artist (brain images).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001934.g002
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For reasons like these, the relatively
sudden origin of language poses difficulties
that may be called ‘‘Darwin’s problem.’’
The Minimalist Account of
Language—Progress towards
Resolving ‘‘Darwin’s Problem’’
The Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT)
[6], as discussed above, greatly eases the
explanatory burden for evolutionary anal-
ysis, since virtually all of the antecedent
‘‘machinery’’ for language is presumed to
have been present long before the human
species appeared. For instance, it appears
that the ability to perceive ‘‘distinctive
features’’ such as the difference between
the sound b, as in bat, as opposed to p, as
in pat, might be present in the mammalian
lineage generally [37,38]. The same holds
for audition. Both comprise part of the
externalization system for language. Fur-
thermore, the general constraint of effi-
cient computation would also seem plau-
sibly antecedent in the cognitive
computation of ancestral species. The only
thing lacking for language would be merge,
some specific way to externalize the
internal computations and, importantly,
the ‘‘atomic conceptual elements’’ that we
have identified with words. Without
merge, there would be no way to assemble
the arbitrarily large, hierarchically struc-
tured objects with their specific interpre-
tations in the language of thought that
distinguish human language from other
animal cognitive systems—just as Darwin
insisted: ‘‘A complex train of thought can
be no more carried out without the use of
words, whether spoken or silent, than a
long calculation without the use of figures
or algebra’’ ([39], p. 88). With merge,
however, the basic properties of human
language emerge. Evolutionary analysis
can thus be focused on this quite narrowly
defined phenotypic property, merge itself,
as the chief bridge between the ancestral
and modern states for language. Since this
change is relatively minor, it accords with
what we know about the apparent rapidity
of language’s emergence.
Conclusions
The Strong Minimalist Thesis that we
have sketched here is consistent with a
recent and rapid evolutionary emergence
of language. Although this thesis is far
from being established and contains many
open questions, it offers an account that is
compatible with the known empirical
evolutionary evidence. Such an account
also aligns with what we currently know
about the relatively few genomic differ-
ences between our species and other
ancestral Homo species—e.g., only about
100 coding gene differences between
Homo sapiens and H. neanderthalensis,
the majority of them in nonlanguage areas
such as the olfactory and immune systems
[40]. Furthermore, as far as we can tell
from direct historical evidence, the capac-
ity that emerged, namely the ability of any
child to learn any human language, has
remained frozen for 10,000 years or more.
To be sure, such observations must be
interpreted with great care and can
remain only suggestive as long as we lack
the knowledge to even crudely connect
genomic changes to the relevant pheno-
types. Even given these caveats, it appears
that there has simply not been enough
time for large-scale evolutionary changes,
as indicated by the SMT. Clearly, such a
novel computational system could have
led to a large competitive advantage
among the early H. sapiens who
possessed it, particularly when linked to
possibly preexisting perceptual and motor
mechanisms.
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